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The Federal Reserve’s announcement following its January 28,
2004, policy meeting led to one of the largest reactions in the Trea-
sury market on record, with two- and ﬁve-year yields jumping 20
and 25 basis points (bp) respectively in the half-hour surrounding
the announcement—the largest movements around any Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) announcement over the fourteen years
for which we have data. Even more remarkably, this outsized reac-
tion was spurred not by what the FOMC did, but rather by what
it said : indeed, the decision to leave the current federal funds rate
unchanged was completely anticipated by ﬁnancial markets, but the
FOMC’s decision to drop the phrase “policy accommodation can be
maintained for a considerable period” from its accompanying state-
ment and replace it with “the Committee believes it can be patient in
removing its policy accommodation” was read by ﬁnancial markets
as indicating that the FOMC would begin tightening policy sooner
than previously expected.1 On this date, then, treating the monetary
policy action as a 0 bp surprise change in the current federal funds
rate target would be missing the whole story.
In this paper, we investigate the extent to which this observation
is true more generally: are the eﬀects of monetary policy announce-
ments on asset prices adequately characterized by a single factor,
namely the surprise component of the change in the current federal
funds rate target? We perform a test of this hypothesis using the rank
test of Cragg and Donald (1997) and strongly reject the hypothesis
of a single factor. By contrast, we do not reject the hypothesis that
the eﬀects of monetary policy on asset prices are characterized by
two factors. By performing a suitable rotation of these unobserved
factors, we show that they can be given a structural interpretation
as a “current federal funds rate target” factor, corresponding to sur-
prise changes in the current federal funds rate target, and a “future
path of policy” factor, corresponding to changes in futures rates out
to horizons of one year that are independent of changes in the current
funds rate target. We show that this latter (“path”) factor has typi-
cally been associated with signiﬁcant changes in FOMC statements,
such as the January 28 example above. In this way, we generalize and
1For example, the front page of The Wall Street Journal reported the fol-
lowing morning that “investors interpreted the omission of ‘considerable period’
as a signal that the Fed is closer to raising interest rates than many thought”
(Ip 2004).
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improve the single-factor analysis of the eﬀects of monetary policy
on asset prices performed by earlier authors, such as Cook and Hahn
(1989), Kuttner (2001), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002), Rigobon and
Sack (2004), Ellingsen and Soderstrom (2003), and Bernanke and
Kuttner (forthcoming).
To measure the eﬀects of monetary policy actions and statements
on asset prices, we construct a new data set that captures changes
in asset prices in a thirty-minute window and in a one-hour window
bracketing every FOMC announcement going back to 1990 (we use
the term announcement to refer to any means by which a policy deci-
sion was communicated to ﬁnancial markets, including open market
operations as well as explicit press releases). The use of intraday data
allows us to better isolate the response of asset prices to monetary
policy announcements, since we can be almost certain that no other
economic news was released within such a brief interval of time. The
gains from using intraday data are most apparent in the early 1990s,
when on a number of occasions the FOMC eased policy just a few
hours after a weak employment report released earlier in the day.
In estimating the separate eﬀects of monetary policy actions and
statements, we are not suggesting that FOMC statements represent
a policy tool that is completely independent of the federal funds rate
target. In particular, FOMC statements likely exert their eﬀects on
ﬁnancial markets through their inﬂuence on ﬁnancial market expec-
tations of future policy actions. Nonetheless, the two-factor approach
we employ in this paper greatly adds to our understanding of the
response of asset prices to monetary policy announcements—for ex-
ample, we ﬁnd that 75 to 90 percent of the explainable variation in
ﬁve- and ten-year Treasury yields in response to monetary policy an-
nouncements is due to the path factor (associated with statements)
rather than to changes in the federal funds rate target. We interpret
this result as indicating not that policy actions are secondary so much
as that their inﬂuence comes earlier, when investors build in expecta-
tions of those actions in response to FOMC statements (and perhaps
other events, such as speeches and testimony by FOMC members).
Our ﬁndings have important implications for the conduct of
monetary policy in a low-inﬂation environment. In particular,
the fact that FOMC statements have such signiﬁcant eﬀects on
long-term yields suggests that the FOMC may be able to credibly
commit to future plans for the federal funds rate. Thus, even when
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faced with a low or zero nominal funds rate, our results indicate that
the FOMC may be able to eﬀectively communicate to the markets
its intention to keep the federal funds rate low for an extended
period, thereby lowering longer-term interest rates and stimulating
economic growth.2
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 pro-
vides a detailed study of surprises in the federal funds rate target
and measures asset price responses to these surprises. Section 2 tests
whether there are additional dimensions underlying monetary pol-
icy announcements, ﬁnds that one additional dimension is required,
shows that this additional factor is closely associated with FOMC
statements, and estimates the response of asset prices to this addi-
tional factor. Section 3 concludes. The appendix provides technical
details regarding our factor test and the estimation of the unobserved
factors, and a data appendix (only available online at www.ijcb.org)
provides a complete listing of our monetary policy announcement
dates, times, and federal funds rate and statement surprise measures
extending back to 1990.
1. The Eﬀects of Changes in the Federal Funds Rate
Target on Asset Prices
1.1 Methodology
We begin our analysis in the framework of one-dimensional mea-
sures of monetary policy surprises that has been used in the existing
literature. To measure the eﬀects of unexpected monetary policy ac-
tions (changes in the federal funds rate) on asset prices, we rely on
the following regression, which has been frequently estimated in the
literature:
∆yt = α + β∆xt + εt (1)
where ∆xt denotes the surprise component of the change in the fed-
eral funds rate target announced by the FOMC, ∆yt denotes the
change in a bond yield or stock market index over an interval that
2Reifschneider and Williams (2000) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) pro-
vide theoretical support for the argument that a central bank is relatively uncon-
strained by the zero nominal bound so long as it can credibly commit to future
policy actions. Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) investigate the potential
eﬀectiveness of monetary policy at the zero nominal bound empirically.
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brackets the monetary policy announcement, and εt is a stochastic
error term that captures the eﬀects of other factors that inﬂuence
the asset in question.
We use a high-frequency event-study analysis to estimate equa-
tion (1). One generally cannot estimate equation (1) using monthly
or quarterly data due to simultaneous equations and omitted vari-
ables bias. In particular, the change in monetary policy could ac-
tually be a response of monetary policy to the change in the asset
price that took place earlier in the month or quarter, due to the di-
rect eﬀects of stock market wealth on the economic outlook or due
to the signal that term spreads provide about future economic activ-
ity and inﬂation.3 Alternatively, both the change in monetary policy
and the change in the asset price could be responding to important
macroeconomic news (captured by εt) that was released earlier in the
period, such as an employment report.4 In either case, the classical
regression assumption that εt is orthogonal to ∆xt is violated.5
These problems can be mitigated by using higher-frequency
data to shrink the time period around the policy decision. Kuttner
(2001), for example, uses daily data to measure changes in Trea-
sury yields and the surprise component of FOMC monetary policy
announcements. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) and Ellingsen and
3Rigobon and Sack (2003) discuss reasons why asset prices might be expected
to feed back into monetary policy. Using a heteroskedasticity-based identiﬁcation
procedure, they estimate a statistically and economically signiﬁcant response
of monetary policy to the stock market, and this response has the expected
positive sign. Using their heteroskedasticity-based procedure, Rigobon and Sack
(2004) also estimate the size of the endogeneity and omitted variables problems
in estimating equation (1).
4Asset prices can respond to macroeconomic news for many reasons other
than changes in monetary policy expectations: First, information about economic
output is likely to inﬂuence expectations of corporate earnings and dividends,
hence stock prices; second, information about the government budget or current
account deﬁcit would, assuming home bias in savings and imperfect Ricardian
equivalence, aﬀect bond yields; third, investors’ appetite for risk can change in
response to economic developments, to name a few examples.
5One way to partially account for these issues is to estimate a VAR for the asset
price, the policy instrument, and other relevant macroeconomic variables, as in
Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996) and Evans and Marshall (1998). The problem with
this approach is that the recursive identifying restrictions typically employed are
not plausible for fast-moving ﬁnancial market variables. (Two exceptions to this
rule are the heteroskedasticity-based identiﬁcation procedure used by Rigobon
and Sack [2003, 2004] and the high-frequency identiﬁcation procedure used by
Cochrane and Piazzesi [2002] and Faust, Swanson, and Wright [2004a].)
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Soderstrom (2003) perform variations on this analysis, and Bernanke
and Kuttner (forthcoming) apply the method to measure the eﬀects
of monetary policy announcements on the stock market. However, as
noted by Rudebusch (1998) and Bernanke and Kuttner (forthcom-
ing), simultaneity in equation (1) is still a potential problem even
at daily frequency because, for a time, the FOMC often changed its
target for the federal funds rate just hours after (and in response
to) the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ employment report release. As a
result, event-study regressions using daily data in part capture the
endogenous response of asset prices and monetary policy to the infor-
mation that was released earlier in the day, as well as noise from other
ﬁnancial market developments that took place throughout the day.
We address this potential problem by estimating regression (1)
using intraday data to measure both the funds rate surprise ∆xt
and the change in the asset price ∆yt. By measuring these changes
in a suﬃciently narrow window of time around the monetary policy
announcement, we can be sure that the FOMC decision was in no
way inﬂuenced by asset price movements or other macroeconomic
news over that interval. In addition, by shrinking the event-study
window down to an hour or less, it becomes much less likely that
any other signiﬁcant events took place within this narrow window
that might have inﬂuenced asset prices, thereby increasing the
precision of our estimates.
1.2 Dates and Times of Monetary Policy Announcements
To perform the above analysis using intraday data, we ﬁrst put to-
gether a complete list of dates and times of monetary policy an-
nouncements from January 1990 through December 2004. In Febru-
ary 1994, the FOMC began issuing a press release after every meet-
ing and every change in policy, and thus the announcement dates
and times are simply those of the corresponding press releases.6
Prior to 1994, the FOMC did not explicitly announce changes in
its target for the federal funds rate, but such changes were implicitly
6Since 1995, these press releases have occurred at about 2:15 p.m., after reg-
ularly scheduled FOMC meetings; press releases for intermeeting policy moves
and FOMC decisions in 1994 were released at varying times throughout the day.
We obtained all of these dates and times from the oﬃce of the secretary of the
Federal Reserve Board.
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communicated to ﬁnancial markets through the size and type of open
market operation. Thus, prior to 1994, the date and time of a mone-
tary policy announcement are typically those of the next open market
operation following the FOMC decision.7
The dates, times, and methods of communication of FOMC mon-
etary policy announcements are reported in table 1 of the online data
appendix. Note that this listing includes not just dates on which the
FOMC actually changed the federal funds rate, but also dates on
which there was an FOMC meeting followed by no change in policy,
since in some cases the FOMC’s decision not to change policy sur-
prised ﬁnancial markets and led to movements in asset prices. The
rightmost column of this table reports other major macroeconomic
data releases that took place on each date, before the monetary pol-
icy announcement. From the table, we can see that eight monetary
policy announcements occurred on the date of an employment re-
port release, seven announcements occurred on the date of a gross
domestic product release, nine occurred on the date of a consumer
price index release, and ﬁve on the date of a producer price index
release, to name just a few.
1.3 The Surprise Component of Federal Funds Rate Changes
For each monetary policy announcement, we measure the surprise
component of the change in the federal funds rate target using
federal funds futures. We use the surprise component of monetary
policy announcements in estimating regression (1) because changes
in policy that are expected by ﬁnancial markets should have little or
7On a few occasions between 1990 and 1994, the FOMC issued, prior to the
open market operation, a press release announcing a change in the discount rate
oﬀered to depository institutions, and market participants correctly inferred from
the press release a corresponding change in the target federal funds rate as well.
On those occasions, we set the time of the monetary policy announcement to
the time of the discount rate change press release. Open market operations over
this period were conducted at 11:30 a.m. every day. There are a few dates on
which volatility in the federal funds market prevented the Open Market Trading
Desk from successfully communicating the FOMC’s intentions for the funds rate
the ﬁrst morning after the FOMC’s decision (see Kuttner 2003). On these dates,
we regard the announcement as having taken place on whichever morning the
Credit Markets column of The Wall Street Journal regarded as a clear signal of
the Federal Reserve’s intentions, as reported by Kuttner (2003). This is more of
an issue prior to 1990 than for our sample period in this paper.
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no eﬀect on asset prices, a hypothesis that is conﬁrmed by Kuttner
(2001). Thus, using the raw changes in the federal funds rate target as
the right-hand-side variable ∆xt would impart an errors-in-variables
bias to our estimates of β to the extent that the monetary policy
decisions were correctly anticipated by ﬁnancial markets.
Federal funds futures have traded at the Chicago Board of Trade
exchange since October 1988 and settle based on the average eﬀective
federal funds rate that is realized for the calendar month speciﬁed in
the contract. Thus, daily changes in the current-month futures rate
largely reﬂect revisions to the market’s expectations for the federal
funds rate over the remainder of the month. As described in the
appendix, the change in the current month’s contract rate on the
day of an FOMC announcement can be scaled up to account for the
timing of the announcement within the month, and thereby measure
the surprise component of the FOMC’s announcement for the federal
funds rate. For the present paper, we acquired tick-by-tick data on
all federal funds futures contract trades from January 1990 to the
present from Genesis Financial Technologies. To provide a sense of
the quality of this data and its advantages, ﬁgure 1 graphs the data
on three illustrative dates:
1. June 25, 2003, was the date of a regularly scheduled FOMC
meeting (see panel a). Trades were intermittent throughout the day
until just before and just after the FOMC’s press release at 2:15
p.m. At that time, the FOMC announced that it was lowering its
target for the federal funds rate from 1.25 percent to 1 percent.
According to surveys and press reports both before and after the
policy announcement, many market participants had been expecting
the FOMC to ease policy by 50 bp at the meeting. Thus, this decision
is characterized as a 13 bp tightening surprise under our measure.
This example illustrates two key points: First, ﬁnancial markets seem
to fully adjust to the policy action within just a few minutes—i.e.,
there is no evidence of learning or sluggish adjustment to the target
rate decision going on after about 2:20 p.m. in this example. Second,
the federal funds rate surprise is not necessarily in the same direction
as the federal funds rate action itself.
2. April 9, 1992, was the date of an intermeeting monetary pol-
icy move (see panel b). The FOMC reduced its target for the federal
funds rate from 4 percent to 3.75 percent that morning, but given
that this date precedes 1994, the FOMC did not issue a press release
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Figure 1. Intraday Trading in Federal Funds Futures
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about its change in policy to the public. As can be seen in the ﬁg-
ure, trading in federal funds futures was thin until shortly before the
open market operation at 11:30 a.m. At that time, the Open Mar-
ket Trading Desk injected a signiﬁcant quantity of reserves into the
market, and market participants correctly inferred from this that the
FOMC had changed its target for the funds rate, causing the futures
rate to move quickly to the new target rate.8
8The federal funds futures contract rate falls to 3.85 percent after the an-
nouncement rather than the new funds rate target of 3.75 percent because nine
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3. September 4, 1992, witnessed the release of a very weak em-
ployment report at 8:30 a.m. (see panel c). In response to that report,
investors signiﬁcantly revised downward their expectations for the
federal funds rate, pushing the futures rate down sharply. Sometime
after the poor data release, the FOMC decided to reduce its tar-
get for the federal funds rate from 3.25 percent to 3 percent. Again,
because there was no press release, the FOMC’s decision became
known to the markets at 11:30 a.m., the time of the open market
operation. In contrast to panel b, however, the FOMC’s decision for
the funds rate on this date was essentially completely anticipated by
the time it was signaled to the market—indeed, our intraday mea-
sure of the funds rate surprise (reported in table 2 of the online data
appendix and discussed below) is 0 bp. By contrast, the daily mea-
sure of the funds rate surprise is –22 bp, because it incorporates the
endogenous policy response to the weak employment report. In this
case, we would not want to use the daily measure of the funds rate
surprise in an event-study regression, because it would suﬀer from
the omitted variables problem discussed earlier (in that the employ-
ment report itself has sizable eﬀects on stock prices, bond yields, and
monetary policy expectations).
To focus on the monetary policy decision itself, we compute
policy surprises by looking at changes in the futures rate in nar-
row windows around the FOMC announcements. More speciﬁcally,
online data appendix table 2 reports two intraday measures, a “tight”
window and a “wide” window, which begin ten (ﬁfteen) minutes prior
to the monetary policy announcement and end twenty (forty-ﬁve)
minutes after the policy announcement, respectively, for the period
from January 1990 through December 2004.9 For comparison, the
table also reports a “daily” window that begins with the ﬁnancial
market close the day before the policy announcement and ends with
the ﬁnancial market close the day of the policy announcement. On
most of the days in our sample, the two intraday measures are quite
days of the month have already elapsed with an average federal funds rate of 4
percent, which will result in a month-average funds rate for April of 3.85 percent.
9When there is no federal funds futures trade exactly at the beginning of the
speciﬁed window, we use the most recent price. When there is no trade exactly
at the end of the speciﬁed window, we use the next available trade price. Federal
funds futures trading is often sparse early in our sample period, but becomes
signiﬁcantly more dense around the times of macroeconomic data releases and
monetary policy announcements.
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similar to the daily measure: the average absolute diﬀerence between
the daily and two intraday surprise measures is only about 2 bp, and
the diﬀerence is 0 bp on many days. There are a few days, however,
on which the diﬀerences between the intraday measures and the daily
measure are quite large: for example, there are ﬁve observations for
which the discrepancy between the tight surprise and the daily sur-
prise exceeds 10 bp. Each of those observations took place before
1994 on the day of an employment report release, as in the exam-
ple of September 4, 1992, discussed previously. Figure 2 makes this
point graphically: as can be seen in the top panel, the tight window
Figure 2. Measures of Surprises in the Federal Funds Rate
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Note: Hollow circles denote days of employment report releases.
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and daily window surprises are in very close agreement on all but a
handful of dates, almost all of which correspond to days on which the
FOMC was responding to an employment report release (depicted
by the hollow circles). By contrast, in the bottom panel of the ﬁgure,
we see that the two intraday measures are in very close agreement
on all dates in our sample.
We draw two conclusions from these observations. First, the
FOMC decision accounted for the vast majority of the movement in
the federal funds futures rate on all of the non-employment-report
days in our sample. This is perhaps surprising, given the large
number of other data releases that also coincided with monetary
policy announcements in data appendix table 1, and is in itself
an important ﬁnding: it shows that for samples that exclude em-
ployment report dates, or samples that begin in 1994, the surprise
component of monetary policy announcements can be measured
very well using just daily data. Second, FOMC actions were priced
into the federal funds futures market almost immediately—quickly
enough to be completely captured by our tight, thirty-minute
window—consistent with the examples discussed above. Thus, we
can feel comfortable focusing on the analysis using our tight window
of thirty minutes, although we will report results using the wider
one-hour window as well.
1.4 The Eﬀect of Federal Funds Rate Changes on Asset Prices
Table 1 presents our results for regression equation (1) estimated us-
ing intraday data on bond yields and stock prices.10 The independent
variable is the surprise component of the change in the federal funds
rate target just described, and the dependent variable is the change
in the ﬁnancial variable measured over the same window. We present
results for the tight (thirty-minute), wide (one-hour), and daily win-
dows described above.
Our results for stock prices imply that, on average, a surprise 25
bp tightening in the federal funds rate leads to a little more than
10We obtained tick-by-tick Treasury yield data back to June 1991 for on-the-
run Treasury securities from GovPX, a consortium of interdealer brokers that
accounted for a large portion of trading volume in Treasury securities over our
sample. For equity prices, we obtained ﬁve-minute intraday quotes on the S&P
500 index back to the mid-1980s, which are available from a variety of sources.
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a 1 percent fall in the S&P 500, and these estimates are highly sig-
niﬁcant. The estimated coeﬃcients do not diﬀer greatly across the
intraday and daily regressions, although the eﬀects of the omitted
employment report variable can be seen clearly in the scatter plots
in ﬁgure 3: the handful of days on which the policy decision followed
an employment report, shown by the hollow points, do not appear
unusual when the intraday data are used, but in the daily data they
stand out as large policy easings that yielded no gains in equity
prices, most likely due to the negative direct inﬂuence of the weak
employment reports.
The most striking feature of ﬁgure 3, however, is the increase
in tightness of the relationship as we move from daily to intraday
data. By eliminating the eﬀects of employment reports and other
news that occurred on the days of monetary policy announcements,
the relationship between monetary policy actions and equity prices
becomes much clearer in the ﬁgure. This advantage also stands out
in the regression results in table 1, in terms of the much greater
precision of the coeﬃcient estimates and a tripling of R2 from .12
to .36.
Intraday data yield additional beneﬁts for our Treasury yield re-
gressions. As shown in ﬁgure 4, employment report days (the hollow
points) stand out in the daily data as very large funds rate surprises
and large changes in the three-month Treasury-bill rate in the same
direction, reﬂecting the fact that the employment report has a very
large inﬂuence on both the FOMC decision and the short end of the
Treasury yield curve.11 By contrast, those days do not stand out
at all when the intraday windows are used. Moreover, employment
report surprises appear to have a larger eﬀect on the T-bill rate com-
pared to policy surprises. Because of this, the estimated coeﬃcient in
the regression is biased upward if daily data are used. As with equity
prices, the response of the T-bill rate to monetary policy actions is
also estimated much more precisely using intraday data, reﬂected in
the much smaller standard errors (about half the size of the daily
measures) and the much higher R2 (.80 versus .56).
The diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients between the intraday regres-
sions and the daily regression become much smaller at horizons of
11Recall that our intraday Treasury data extend back only to June 1991, so our
Treasury yield regressions and graphs contain eighteen fewer observations (and
only ﬁve employment report dates instead of eight).
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Figure 3. Response of S&P 500 to Monetary Policy
Surprises
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Figure 4. Response of Three-Month Treasury Yield to
Monetary Policy Surprises
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two years or more, but this observation is somewhat misleading, as a
single outlier, January 3, 2001, pulls the daily estimate toward the in-
traday one (shown in ﬁgure 5).12 Without that one observation in the
upper left, the daily regression would estimate a signiﬁcant response
of the ten-year rate to the FOMC announcement of 0.28 rather than
the statistically insigniﬁcant 0.17 that is estimated including the out-
lier. By contrast, using the intraday data, the estimated coeﬃcient
changes only very slightly (from 0.13 to 0.17) when we exclude that
observation. As before, the precision of our estimates also improves
dramatically using intraday data, with the standard errors being
about half as large. This makes the response of the ten-year Trea-
sury yield—which is statistically indistinguishable from zero using
daily data—signiﬁcantly greater than zero (albeit small) using our
tight-window data.
The response of the term structure can also be expressed in terms
of forward rates. We compute the ﬁve-year forward Treasury rate be-
ginning ﬁve years ahead from ﬁve- and ten-year Treasury yields using
the Shiller-Campbell-Schoenholtz (1983) approximation. The esti-
mated response of the forward rate to the policy surprise is negative
over this sample. This is consistent with the ﬁndings of Gu¨rkaynak,
Sack, and Swanson (2003) that far-ahead forward rates typically
move inversely with the monetary policy surprise, although our es-
timates here are not highly statistically signiﬁcant, partly because
we cannot compute intraday forward rate changes that begin more
than ﬁve years ahead. Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2003) present
their ﬁndings in terms of the nine-year-ahead one-year forward rate,
which is probably a better measure of far-ahead forward rates.13
12On that day, although the FOMC unexpectedly eased policy, which would
normally be associated with a fall in Treasury yields, market participants re-
portedly became much more optimistic about the economic outlook as a result,
leading to a huge rally in equity markets (including an astounding 14 percent rise
in the NASDAQ that afternoon) and a large upward shift in Treasury yields. This
outlier poses particular problems for a researcher using only daily data, since it is
unclear whether the observation should be dropped or retained, and the empirical
results are highly sensitive to this choice; by contrast, using the intraday data,
the observation poses no problems.
13We only have intraday data for the on-the-run ﬁve- and ten-year Treasury
notes, which gives us the forward rate from ﬁve to ten years ahead, but not for any
ﬁner subintervals. The ﬁve-year-ahead ﬁve-year rate may not capture movements
in far-ahead forward rates as well as the nine-year-ahead one-year rate.
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Figure 5. Response of Ten-Year Treasury Yield to
Monetary Policy Surprises
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2. The Eﬀects of FOMC Statements on Asset Prices
2.1 Testing for Additional Dimensions of Monetary Policy
Announcements
The preceding section assumed that the eﬀects of FOMC an-
nouncements on asset prices are completely (or at least adequately)
described by the surprise component of the change in the federal
funds rate target. Although this assumption is standard in the exist-
ing literature, the example of January 28, 2004, given earlier raises se-
rious questions regarding its validity. In this section, we ask whether
the example of January 28 was a one-time occurrence or a manifes-
tation of something much more systematic. If the latter, how many
additional dimensions are required to adequately characterize mon-
etary policy announcements?14
The above questions essentially ask how many latent factors un-
derlie the response of asset prices to monetary policy announcements.
Let X denote the T×n matrix, with rows corresponding to mone-
tary policy announcements, columns corresponding to asset prices,
and each element of X reporting the change in the corresponding
asset price in a thirty-minute window around the corresponding an-
nouncement. Writing X in the form
X = FΛ + η (2)
where F is a T×k matrix of unobserved factors (with k < n), Λ is a
k×n matrix of factor loadings, and η is a T×n matrix of white noise
disturbances, we wish to know how many factors (columns of F )
are required to adequately describe X. The hypothesis that a single
factor (for example, the surprise component of changes in the federal
funds rate) is suﬃcient is a statement that there exists a T×1 vector
F and constants λi, i =1,...,k, such that the matrix X is described
by F×[λ1,...,λk] up to white noise.
This restriction on the structure of the data X can be tested
using the matrix rank test of Cragg and Donald (1997). In brief,
the null hypothesis that X is described by k0 common factors can
14One can imagine that several dimensions might be required, corresponding to
information about the future path of interest rates, policymakers’ objectives and
preferences, and perhaps the future paths of output and inﬂation, if the FOMC
possesses private information about these latter two variables.
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be tested against the alternative that X is described by k > k0
factors by measuring the minimum distance between Cov(X) and
the covariance matrices of all possible factor models (2) with k0
factors. This distance, after a suitable normalization, has a limiting
χ2 distribution with (n − k0)(n − k0+1)/2 – n degrees of freedom.
Additional details of the method are provided in the appendix.
Table 2 reports the results of this test applied to two sets of
assets: one that includes all of our Treasury yields and stock prices,
and another that includes only federal funds futures and eurodollar
futures with one year or less to expiration.15 We consider the latter
set of assets in this table because they will turn out to be very useful
in the structural interpretation of the factors, below.
As can be seen in table 2, the hypothesis that the response of as-
set prices to monetary policy announcements is characterized by zero
or by one common factor is clearly rejected. An important and direct
corollary of this ﬁnding is that surprise changes in the federal funds
rate alone are not suﬃcient to describe the response of asset prices to
monetary policy announcements, in contrast to one of the standard
assumptions in the literature. However, as is also clear in table 2,
we ﬁnd that two factors are suﬃcient—tests of this hypothesis are
not rejected at even the 10 percent level. Given our strong rejection
of zero or one factor, this result is perhaps somewhat surprising—it
implies that, despite the potentially unlimited complexity of mone-
tary policy statements and hence announcements, ﬁnancial markets
nonetheless have reacted as if there is essentially only one additional
degree of information beyond the surprise change in the federal funds
rate target. In the remainder of this section, we turn to estimating
and interpreting this additional dimension of U.S. monetary policy
and estimating its eﬀect on Treasury yields and stock prices.
15Treasury yields include the three-month, six-month, two-year, ﬁve-year, and
ten-year yields. Recall that we only have intraday data for these yields begin-
ning in July 1991, which explains the smaller number of observations for these
securities in table 2. For futures rates, we use ﬁve contracts that pin down the
expected path of the federal funds rate over the next year without overlapping:
the current-month and three-month-ahead federal funds futures contracts (with
a scale factor to account for the timing of FOMC meetings within the month)
and the two-, three-, and four-quarter-ahead eurodollar futures contracts. See the
appendix for details. Avoiding overlap is desirable because very similar assets will
tend to covary strongly, producing an additional factor even if that variation is
orthogonal to all of the other assets in X.
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2.2 Estimation of the Two Factors
We estimate the unobserved factor matrix F using the standard
method of principal components applied to our data matrix X.16
This procedure decomposes the matrix X into a set of orthogonal
vectors Fi, i= 1,..., n, where F1 is the (length-T ) vector that has
maximum explanatory power for X, F2 is the vector that has maxi-
mum explanatory power for the residuals of X after projecting each
column on F1, and so on. Based on the results of our factor rank
test, above, we will restrict attention to the ﬁrst two factors (F1
and F2) estimated by this procedure. Details are provided in the
appendix.
As mentioned above, we estimate the unobserved factors F1 and
F2 using the set of federal funds futures and eurodollar futures rates
with one year or less to expiration that characterize the expected
path of the funds rate over the upcoming year.17 Estimates of the
unobserved factors using Treasury yields and stock prices are quite
similar; the reason for focusing on the shorter-term futures rates for
estimation is that it makes the structural interpretation of the two
factors, and interpretation of the eﬀects of the two factors on bond
yields and stock prices, more clear.
2.3 A Structural Interpretation of the Two Factors
The two factors F1 and F2 explain a maximal fraction of the vari-
ance of X, but do not have a structural interpretation. For example,
both factors are correlated with the surprises in the current federal
funds rate target, so we cannot interpret one factor as the change
in the federal funds rate target and the other factor as some other
dimension of monetary policy. To address this deﬁciency and allow
for a more structural interpretation of the factors, we perform a ro-
tation of F1 and F2 to yield two new factors, which we call Z1 and
16The primary alternative to principal components is Kalman ﬁltering, which
is optimal under the assumption of normally distributed residuals. However, the
normality assumption may not ﬁt our data very well.
17Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2002) show that these rates are the best
ﬁnancial market predictors of the federal funds rate at horizons out to a year. As
one familiar with factor decompositions of the yield curve might expect, we ﬁnd
that F1 and F2 look very much like “level” and “slope” factors from that litera-
ture, although our sample diﬀers from that literature in that we focus exclusively
on the brief intervals around monetary policy announcements.
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Z2, which are still orthogonal and explain the matrix X to exactly
the same extent that F1 and F2 did, but for which the second factor
(Z2) has no eﬀect on the current federal funds rate. In other words,
we deﬁne
Z = FU
in such a way that U is a 2×2 orthogonal matrix and the second
column of Z is a vector that is associated on average with no change
in the current-month federal funds futures rate. Exact details of this
rotation are reported in the appendix. As a result of this transfor-
mation, we can regard the unexpected change in the current target
for the federal funds rate as being driven exclusively by Z1 (plus a
small amount of white noise), and Z2 represents all other aspects
of FOMC announcements that move futures rates for the upcoming
year without changing the current federal funds rate. The factor Z2
therefore includes any information (besides the decision for the cur-
rent target rate) that aﬀects the expected path for monetary policy
over the upcoming year. Accordingly, we refer to Z1 and Z2 as the
“target” factor and the “path” factor, respectively. The estimated
values for the target and path factors for each monetary policy an-
nouncement in our sample are reported in table 3 of the online data
appendix.
Note that the target factor (Z1) deﬁned in this way should be
similar to—but not exactly equal to—the measure of federal funds
target surprises we presented in the previous section and reported in
data appendix table 2.18 To check the tightness of the relationship
between these two measures, we regressed our target surprises on
the factor Z1 (results not reported) and found that Z1 is in fact
very close to our previous measure, with a correlation of over 95
percent (R2 of .91). Thus, to further facilitate interpretation of Z1
18The two measures generally are not identical because the factor estimation
procedure strips out white noise from the data. Thus, Z1 will tend to exclude
part of the “timing” component of federal funds rate surprises—i.e., changes in
the funds rate target that are only a surprise to the extent that they occur at
the present meeting instead of the next meeting. (Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson
[2002] and Gu¨rkaynak [2005] discuss “timing” surprises in more detail.) To the
extent that assets other than the current-month federal funds futures rate ignore
these timing surprises, the factor estimation procedure will assign this component
to white noise rather than to Z1. In this respect, Z1 is a better measure of the
important component of funds rate surprises than is the standard measure based
on the current-month futures rate.
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as the surprise change in the funds rate target, we normalize its scale
so that a change of .01 in Z1 corresponds to a surprise of 1 bp in
the federal funds rate target. Similarly, to facilitate interpretation
of the second factor, we normalize its scale so that the eﬀect of Z2
on the four-quarter-ahead eurodollar futures rate is exactly the same
as the eﬀect of Z1 on the four-quarter-ahead eurodollar futures rate,
about 55 bp.19
2.4 The Association Between the Path Factor and FOMC
Statements
The path factor Z2 corresponds to all aspects of FOMC announce-
ments that move futures rates for the upcoming year without chang-
ing the current federal funds rate; thus, it is to some extent a residual
that is subject to various interpretations. In this section, we present
three pieces of evidence that show a close correlation between the
path factor and FOMC statements: ﬁrst, a time series plot that al-
lows comparison of pre-1994 to post-1994 (and also statement to
nonstatement) monetary policy announcements; second, a regression
test of the path factor on a dummy variable indicating the presence
of an FOMC statement; and third, a case study of the largest path
factor observations in our sample. In addition, in section 2.5 below,
we compare our estimated eﬀects of the path factor on asset prices to
the eﬀects of the FOMC minutes release on January 4, 2005, which,
because of new procedures adopted by the FOMC, has many of the
features of an FOMC statement release with no change in the funds
rate target.
In ﬁgure 6, we plot the target and the path factors over time,
with dates on which there was an FOMC statement plotted as solid
bars and those on which there was no FOMC statement (dates prior
to 1994 and dates from 1994 to 1999 on which there was no change
in the federal funds rate target) plotted as hollow bars. As can be
seen in the ﬁgure, there have been many large realizations of the
path factor in recent years, while realizations of the path factor prior
to 1994 (and on nonstatement days in general) were typically very
small.
19These scale normalizations are performed for the July 1991–December 2004
sample, the period for which we have data on U.S. Treasury yields.
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Figure 6. Monetary Policy Surprises as Two Factors
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Table 3 veriﬁes this observation econometrically by regressing
the absolute value of the path factor on a constant and a dummy
variable that takes on the value one for all dates on which there
was an FOMC statement. The coeﬃcient on the dummy variable is
positive and highly statistically signiﬁcant, allowing us to strongly
Table 3. Estimated Eﬀects of Policy Statements on
the Size of the Path Factor
Dependent Constant Statement Number
Variable (std. err.) (std. err.) R2 of Obs.
Abs(Z2) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ .18 138
(0.005) (0.014)
Note: Regression of absolute value of path factor on a constant
and dummy variable indicating presence of an FOMC statement.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors reported in parenthe-
ses. ∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 1 percent level.
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reject the hypothesis that FOMC statements and the path factor are
unrelated.20
In table 4, we report details of the ten largest path factor obser-
vations over our sample. Nine of these ten observations (and twenty-
one of the top twenty-ﬁve) correspond to dates on which an FOMC
statement accompanied the federal funds rate target decision; more-
over, ﬁnancial market commentary on these dates (as reported in
the Credit Markets column of The Wall Street Journal the follow-
ing day) typically directly attributed the move in the bond market
to the speciﬁcs of the FOMC statement. Nonetheless, there are a
few exceptions to the correspondence between the path factor and
FOMC statements, which represent signiﬁcant changes in ﬁnancial
market expectations regarding the future path of policy that were
driven by events other than FOMC statements. For example, on De-
cember 20, 1994, market participants were reportedly nervous about
inﬂationary pressures arising from output growth overshooting po-
tential (the subject of a speech by Vice Chairman Blinder just a few
days before), and the failure of the FOMC to move at the December
meeting was reportedly regarded by some participants as perhaps
requiring greater tightening down the road (Pesek and Young 1994),
leading to larger-than-usual changes in expectations for the future
path of policy.21
An interesting feature of the path factor is that—in contrast to
the target factor—there is evidence that ﬁnancial markets may take
some time to digest its implications. For example, if we regress a
wide (one-hour) window measure of the path factor Z2 on the tight
(thirty-minute) window measure of the factor (both calculated as
above), we get an R2 of .83. By contrast, if we perform the same ex-
ercise on the target surprise factor Z1, we get a much higher R2 of .98
(which is consistent with ﬁgures 1 and 2). A natural interpretation
20This ﬁnding is similar to a result in Kohn and Sack (2004), who used a simple
regression to control for the eﬀects of target surprises, with the residual intended
to capture the eﬀects of all other variables, including FOMC statements. They
found that the variance of this residual was much higher on days that the FOMC
released statements.
21We also checked the ﬁnancial press for each of these dates to see whether the
strong response of the path factor on dates without statements could possibly
be due to the release of other important news in the same thirty-minute window
as the monetary policy announcements. We found no such confounding news
releases.
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of this ﬁnding is that changes in the federal funds rate target it-
self are immediately and clearly observable to all ﬁnancial market
participants within minutes of the announcement while, by contrast,
FOMC statements about the policy and economic outlook typically
require time to digest and are subject to a great deal of uncertainty
with respect to how they are interpreted by other ﬁnancial mar-
ket participants, so that the process of assimilating the information
contained in the statements is not instantaneous. Nonetheless, we
continue to emphasize our tight window responses in the analysis
below because most of the policy information is incorporated within
that window and having a narrower window reduces the amount of
noise in our left-hand-side variables, increasing the precision of our
estimates.22
2.5 The Response of Asset Prices to the Target Factor and
Path Factor
We now estimate the eﬀects of each of these two dimensions of mone-
tary policy announcements on asset prices. For each monetary policy
announcement from January 1990 through December 2004, we have
estimates of the target factor and path factor components of the an-
nouncement and we observe the change in Treasury yields and stock
prices in a narrow window bracketing the announcement (the same
left-hand-side variables as in section 1).23 For each Treasury yield or
stock prices, we run the regression
∆yt = α + β Z1,t + γ Z2,t + εt. (3)
Results are reported in table 5.24
22Robustness tests using the wide window data were in line with the results
reported below.
23Recall that, due to data availability, we only observe intraday Treasury re-
sponses beginning in July 1991.
24Because the regressors in table 5 are generated rather than directly observed,
we have also computed the standard errors by bootstrapping to capture the addi-
tional sampling error associated with the ﬁrst-stage factor estimation procedure.
The statistical signiﬁcance of all our results was essentially identical whether
we used the bootstrapped or asymptotic standard errors. Bootstrap percentiles
were based on 1,000 repetitions; in each repetition, we sampled 138 new observa-
tions from the data with replacement, took the two largest principal components
from the synthetic futures data, rotated and normalized them, and regressed the
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As we would expect from the close correspondence between our
target factor and the funds rate target surprises in section 1 (and
from the orthogonality of Z2 to Z1), the estimated coeﬃcients on the
target factor (Z1) are very similar to those we estimated previously in
table 1. In particular, we estimate that a 1 percentage point surprise
tightening in the federal funds rate leads, on average, to a 4.3 percent
decline in the S&P 500 and increases of 49, 28, and 13 bp in two-,
ﬁve-, and ten-year Treasury yields, respectively.
The novel feature of table 5, however, is our estimates of the
eﬀects of the path factor (Z2) on asset prices. As can be seen in
the table, the eﬀect of this factor on the one-year-ahead eurodollar
future rate is the same as the eﬀect of the target factor, by deﬁni-
tion.25 However, the path factor has eﬀects on the other ﬁnancial
variables that diﬀer considerably from the target factor. In particu-
lar, the path factor has a much greater impact on the long end of
the yield curve, with a 1 percentage point innovation to the factor
causing responses of 37 and 28 bp in ﬁve- and ten-year Treasury
yields, respectively. Thus, FOMC statements that move one-year-
ahead policy expectations appear to have much greater eﬀects on
the long end of the yield curve than do changes in the federal funds
target rate itself, even when they generate the same size movement
in one-year-ahead interest rates. Moreover, as can be seen by com-
paring the R2 statistics from the one- and two-factor regressions, the
large majority of variation in long-term Treasury yields seems to be
due to statements rather than funds rate changes, with two-thirds
of the explainable variation in two-year yields, three-fourths of the
explainable variation in ﬁve-year yields, and nine-tenths of the ex-
plainable variation in ten-year yields attributable to the path factor
rather than to changes in the federal funds rate target. Thus, by
focusing only on the FOMC’s decisions regarding the current fed-
eral funds rate target, previous authors have been missing by far the
most important component of monetary policy decisions, especially
synthetic changes in asset prices on the synthetically generated Z1 or Z1 and Z2.
The bootstrapped standard errors are available from the authors upon request.
25The path factor is orthogonal to the monetary policy surprise (and the target
factor) over our full sample, January 1990–December 2004. The coeﬃcient of the
MP Surprise on the path factor in table 5 is not exactly zero because it is reported
for the July 1991–December 2004 sample, for comparability to the Treasury yield
responses.
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in recent years when target funds rate changes have often been well-
anticipated.
By contrast, the eﬀect of changes in the path factor on the stock
market appears to be smaller than the eﬀect of changes in the funds
rate target, amounting to only about –1 percent for a 1 percentage
point innovation. Given the yield curve ﬁndings above, this result is
somewhat surprising: for longer-maturity Treasury securities, policy-
makers’ statements seem to have much larger eﬀects than changes in
the current federal funds rate, but the eﬀect of statements on stock
prices, which also have very long durations, is smaller.
One possible explanation for this pattern is that the statements
that seem to drive the path factor lead, to a greater extent, to pos-
itive revisions in investors’ assessment of the future path of output
and inﬂation, consistent with a story ﬁrst formalized by Romer and
Romer (2000).26 A large positive realization of the path factor, for
example, might be related to a statement suggesting that the FOMC
sees greater output or inﬂation going forward than markets had been
expecting. Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (forthcoming) show that
long-term yields move substantially and positively in response to
positive surprises in macroeconomic data releases for output and in-
ﬂation; thus, if in fact FOMC statements do reveal information about
the future course of these variables, the strong response of long-term
yields to the path factor in this paper would be completely consis-
tent with those earlier results. Moreover, to the extent that ﬁnancial
markets revise upward their forecasts of output (and hence earnings
and dividends) in response to positive path factor surprises, then
the tendency for stocks to fall in response would be muted by the
upwardly revised economic outlook.
As a ﬁnal note, the events of January 4, 2005, provide us with an
interesting out-of-sample test of our results. At 2:00 p.m. that day,
the FOMC for the ﬁrst time released the minutes for its previous
meeting under a new, accelerated schedule—three weeks before (as
opposed to a few days after) the next FOMC meeting. This gives
26This story has been questioned on the basis of a pure target factor analysis by
Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004b). Those authors ﬁnd that surprise tightenings
in what we call the target factor convey essentially no positive information about
the future path of output or inﬂation. However, as in all of the previous literature,
those authors did not consider changes in what we call the path factor, which
our results suggest could be more informative about these variables.
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the minutes release on that date many of the features of an FOMC
statement: for example (and in contrast to speeches or testimony by
individual FOMC members), the minutes report the thinking and
deliberation of the entire FOMC and have been voted on and ap-
proved by the whole committee; moreover, the minutes now provide
additional information about the most recent FOMC meeting. In
the thirty-minute window around the minutes release on January 4,
one-year-ahead eurodollar futures rose 6.5 bp, as the minutes were
taken to imply greater risks of inﬂation and funds rate tightening
than markets had previously been expecting. Two-, ﬁve-, and ten-
year Treasury yields increased 4.9, 5.0, and 4.1 bp, respectively—very
much in line with our estimates of the eﬀects of the path factor in
table 5, which would predict changes of 4.8, 4.4, and 3.3 bp for these
securities, respectively. The S&P 500 declined by .49 percent, some-
what larger than the .11 percent decline predicted by table 5, and
the ﬁve-to-ten-year forward rate rose by 3.0 bp, a bit more than the
1.9 bp predicted by our estimates. Although we cannot rule out the
possibility that markets view minutes and FOMC statements as dif-
fering in important ways, all of these results are broadly in line with
our estimates of the eﬀects of FOMC statements, suggesting that
our estimation and identiﬁcation procedures have been reasonably
eﬀective.
3. Conclusions
Do central bank actions speak louder than words? We ﬁnd that the
answer to this question is a qualiﬁed “no.” In particular, we ﬁnd that
viewing the eﬀects of FOMC announcements on ﬁnancial markets as
driven by a single factor—changes in the federal funds rate target—
is inadequate. Instead, we ﬁnd that a second policy factor—one not
associated with the current federal funds rate decision of the FOMC
but instead with statements that it releases—accounted for more
than three-fourths of the explainable variation in the movements of
ﬁve- and ten-year Treasury yields around FOMC meetings.
We emphasize that our ﬁndings do not imply that FOMC state-
ments represent an independent policy tool. In particular, FOMC
statements likely exert their eﬀects on ﬁnancial markets through
their inﬂuence on ﬁnancial market expectations of future policy ac-
tions. Viewed in this light, our results do not indicate that policy
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actions are secondary so much as that their inﬂuence comes earlier—
when investors build in expectations of those actions in response to
FOMC statements (and perhaps other events, such as speeches and
testimony by FOMC members).
Our ﬁndings have important implications for the literature on the
eﬀects of monetary policy on asset markets. Indeed, we have shown
that previous studies estimating the eﬀects of changes in the federal
funds rate on bond yields and stock prices have been missing most
of the story. This is especially true in recent years, when FOMC
decisions regarding the target for the funds rate have rarely been a
surprise and, instead, changes in the wording of FOMC statements
typically have been the major driver of ﬁnancial market responses.
More broadly, our ﬁnding that FOMC statements have such sig-
niﬁcant eﬀects on asset prices suggests that the FOMC has the ability
to conduct policy with a substantial degree of commitment to a state-
contingent, or conditional, path for the funds rate several quarters or
even years into the future. This ﬁnding has important implications
for the conduct of monetary policy in a low-inﬂation environment—
in particular, even when faced with a low or zero nominal funds rate,
our results directly support the theoretical analysis of Reifschneider
and Williams (2000) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) that the
FOMC is largely unhindered in its ability to conduct policy, because
it has the ability to manipulate ﬁnancial market expectations of fu-
ture policy actions and thereby longer-term interest rates and the
economy more generally.
Appendix. Factor Model Rank Test and Estimation
Testing the Number of Factors
Let X denote a T×n matrix of data generated by a factor model:
X = FΛ + η, (A1)
where F is a T×k matrix of unobserved factors (with k < n), Λ is
a k×n matrix of factor loadings, and η is a T×n matrix of white
noise disturbances. We wish to test the hypothesis that X was gen-
erated by k0 factors against the alternative that X was generated
by k > k0 factors. We do this by computing the distance between
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the covariance matrix of the data, X, and the set of all covariance
matrices corresponding to factor models (A1) with k0 factors.
The covariance matrix ΣX of the data, X, has elements given by
σˆjk = (1/T )
∑
i (xij − x¯j)(xik − x¯k). To compute the Wald statistic,
below, we also need to know the sampling uncertainty surrounding
the σˆjk. This is given by:
Cov(σˆjk, σˆlm) = (1/T 2)
∑
i
[(xij − x¯j)(xik − x¯k)− σˆjk]
× [(xil − x¯l)(xim − x¯m)− σˆlm]. (A2)
The covariance matrix of the factor model (A1) is given by
Λ′Λ + Ση. To compute the distance between the two, we stack the
elements of ΣX and Λ′Λ + Ση into vectors and normalize the dif-
ference, vech(ΣX) – vech(Λ′Λ + Ση), by Cov(vech(ΣX)), whose ele-
ments are given by (A2):
W = [vech(ΣX)− vech(Λ′Λ+Ση)]′Ωˆ−1[vech(ΣX)− vech(Λ′Λ+Ση)],
(A3)
where Ωˆ = Cov(vech(ΣX)). We search over all possible factor load-
ings Λ (nk0 parameters) and white noise variances Ση (n parameters)
to ﬁnd the minimum distance (A3). Under the null hypothesis, this
is a Wald statistic with limiting χ2 distribution on n(n + 1)/2 –
(nk0 + n) + k0(k0 − 1)/2 degrees of freedom (the last term comes
from the fact that there are k0(k0–1)/2 possible rotations of the un-
observed factors F , and hence Λ, which all yield the same observable
model). The Matlab code that performs this factor test is available
from the authors upon request.
Factor Estimation
To estimate the unobserved factors F , let X be the matrix with
138 rows corresponding to monetary policy announcements and ﬁve
columns corresponding to futures contracts with one year or less to
maturity. The third through ﬁfth columns of X are the changes in
price of the second, third, and fourth eurodollar futures contracts,
which have 1.5, 2.5, and 3.5 quarters to expiration on average (eu-
rodollar futures have expiration dates that lie about two weeks before
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the end of each quarter).27 The ﬁrst two columns of X are essen-
tially the changes in the current-month and three-month-ahead fed-
eral funds futures contracts, but contain a scaling adjustment to
account for the timing of FOMC meetings within those months, as
follows.
Federal funds futures have a payout that is based on the aver-
age eﬀective federal funds rate that prevails over the calendar month
speciﬁed in the contract. Thus, immediately before an FOMC meet-
ing, at time t−∆t, the implied rate from the current-month federal
funds future contract, ﬀ 1, is largely a weighted average of the federal
funds rate that has prevailed so far in the month, r0, and the rate
that is expected to prevail for the reminder of the month, r1:28
ff1t−∆t =
d1
D1
r0 +
D1− d1
D1
Et−∆t(r1) + ρ1t−∆t (A4)
where d1 denotes the day of the FOMC meeting, D1 is the number
of days in the month, and ρ1 denotes any term or risk premium that
may be present in the contract. Then, by leading this equation to
time t (twenty minutes after the policy announcement) and diﬀer-
encing, the surprise component of the change in the federal funds
rate target, which we call mp1, is given by29
mp1t = (ff1t − ff1t−∆t) D1
D1− d1 . (A5)
Note that to interpret (A5) as the surprise change in monetary
policy expectations, we need to assume that the change in the risk
27Thus, the second eurodollar futures contract can have as little as one quarter
plus one day to expiration and as much as two quarters to expiration, with
an average horizon of 1.5 quarters over our sample. On expiration, eurodollar
futures settle based on the spot ninety-day eurodollar rate, which is closely tied
to expectations for the federal funds rate over the subsequent ninety-day period.
Thus, these three eurodollar futures contracts are related to federal funds rate
expectations from 1.5–2.5, 2.5–3.5, and 3.5–4.5 quarters ahead, respectively.
28For simplicity, assume that federal funds rate is always equal to the target
rate set by the FOMC, so that we do not have to diﬀerentiate between the
target and actual rates. This has no impact on the surprise measures due to the
diﬀerencing involved.
29Kuttner (2001) also uses this method. For FOMC meetings that occur very
late in the month (i.e., in the last seven days of the month), we use the unscaled
change in the next-month federal funds futures contract to avoid multiplying by
a very large scale factor in (A5), which could unduly magnify changes in bid-ask
spreads or other factors, since federal funds futures are only priced to the nearest
half basis point.
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premium ρ in this narrow window of time is small in comparison
to the change in expectations itself. Piazzesi and Swanson (2004)
provide some evidence that this assumption is not inconsistent with
the data.
We can apply a similar procedure to measure the change in ex-
pectations about r2, the federal funds rate target that will prevail
after the second FOMC meeting from now. Let ﬀ 2 denote the fed-
eral funds futures rate for the month containing the second FOMC
meeting (typically the three-month-ahead contract). Then
ﬀ 2t−∆t =
d2
D2
Et−∆t(r1) +
D2− d2
D2
Et−∆t(r2) + ρ2t−∆t, (A6)
where d2 and D2 are the day of that FOMC meeting and the number
of days in the month containing that FOMC meeting, respectively,
and ρ2 denotes any risk premium in the contract. By leading this
equation to time t and diﬀerencing, the change in expectations for
that second FOMC meeting, which we call mp2, is given by
mp2t =
[
(ﬀ 2t − ﬀ 2t−∆t) − d2
D2
mp1t
]
D2
D2− d2 . (A7)
Additional details can be obtained from various sources.30
As described in section 2, we decompose X into its principal com-
ponents after normalizing each column to have zero mean and unit
variance. We let F1 and F2 denote the ﬁrst two principal components
of X, and normalize each of them to have unit variance.
To allow for a more structural interpretation of these unobserved
factors, we rotate them so that the ﬁrst factor corresponds to surprise
changes in the current federal funds rate target and the second factor
corresponds to moves in interest rate expectations over the coming
year that are not driven by changes in the current funds rate. In
other words, we deﬁne a 138×2 matrix Z by
Z = FU, (A8)
30Gu¨rkaynak (2005) discusses measuring policy expectations and surprises at
horizons farther ahead than the current meeting; Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson
(2002) show that federal funds futures are the best ﬁnancial market predictors
of the federal funds rate with the smallest average term premium; Piazzesi and
Swanson (2004) estimate to what extent risk premia in these markets vary over
time; and Kuttner (2001) discusses the construction and some uses of mp1.
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where
U =

 α1 β1
α2 β2

 ,
and where U is identiﬁed by four restrictions. First, the columns of
U are normalized to have unit length (which normalizes Z1 and Z2
to have unit variance). Second, the new factors Z1 and Z2 should
remain orthogonal to each other:
E(Z1Z2) = α1β1 + α2β2 = 0. (A9)
Lastly, we impose the restriction that Z2 does not inﬂuence the
current policy surprise, mp1, as follows. Let γ1 and γ2 denote the
(known) loadings of mp1 on F1 and F2, respectively. Since
F1 =
1
α1β2 − α2β1
[β2Z1 − α2Z2] , (A10)
F2 =
1
α1β2 − α2β1
[α1Z2 − β1Z1] , (A11)
it follows that:
γ2α1 − γ1α2 = 0,
which is the ﬁnal restriction. It is then easy to solve for the unique
matrix U satisfying these restrictions.
Finally, as noted in section 2, we rescale Z1 and Z2 so that Z1
moves the current policy surprise mp1 one-for-one and Z2 has the
same magnitude eﬀect on the year-ahead eurodollar futures rate as
Z1 has on that rate (about 55.1 bp).
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Date Time Method of Announcement Intermeeting Move? Other Macroeconomic Data Releases That Day    
8-Feb-90 11:30am Open Market Operation
28-Mar-90 11:30am Open Market Operation GNP and NIPAs, New Home Sales
16-May-90 11:30am Open Market Operation CPI, Housing Starts and Permits
5-Jul-90 11:30am Open Market Operation Auto Sales
13-Jul-90 11:30am Open Market Operation T PPI, Retail Sales
22-Aug-90 11:30am Open Market Operation
3-Oct-90 11:30am Open Market Operation Auto Sales, Factory Orders
29-Oct-90 11:30am Open Market Operation T
14-Nov-90 11:30am Open Market Operation Retail Sales
7-Dec-90 11:30am Open Market Operation T Employment Report
18-Dec-90 3:30pm Discount Rate Change Press Release CPI, Merchandise Trade
8-Jan-91 11:30am Open Market Operation T
1-Feb-91 9:15am Discount Rate Change Press Release T Employment Report, NAPM Survey
7-Feb-91 11:30am Open Market Operation
8-Mar-91 11:30am Open Market Operation T Employment Report
27-Mar-91 11:30am Open Market Operation GNP and NIPAs
30-Apr-91 9:30am Discount Rate Change Press Release T Consumer Confidence, ECI, Factory Orders
15-May-91 11:30am Open Market Operation Business Inventories
5-Jul-91 11:30am Open Market Operation Employment Report
6-Aug-91 11:30am Open Market Operation T
21-Aug-91 11:30am Open Market Operation U.S. Budget Deficit
13-Sep-91 9:10am Discount Rate Change Press Release T CPI, Retail Sales
2-Oct-91 11:30am Open Market Operation New Home Sales
30-Oct-91 11:30am Open Market Operation T New Home Sales, PCE, Personal Income
6-Nov-91 8:45am Discount Rate Change Press Release
6-Dec-91 11:30am Open Market Operation T Employment Report
18-Dec-91 11:30am Open Market Operation
20-Dec-91 8:30am Discount Rate Change Press Release T GDP and NIPAs, U.S. Budget Deficit
6-Feb-92 11:30am Open Market Operation Factory Orders
1-Apr-92 11:30am Open Market Operation NAPM Survey
9-Apr-92 11:30am Open Market Operation T PPI
20-May-92 11:30am Open Market Operation Merchandise Trade
2-Jul-92 9:15am Discount Rate Change Press Release T Employment Report, Factory Orders
19-Aug-92 11:30am Open Market Operation Merchandise Trade
4-Sep-92 11:30am Open Market Operation T Employment Report
7-Oct-92 11:30am Open Market Operation
18-Nov-92 11:30am Open Market Operation Merchandise Trade
23-Dec-92 11:30am Open Market Operation Consumer Confidence, Durable Goods Orders, PCE
4-Feb-93 11:30am Open Market Operation Factory Orders
24-Mar-93 11:30am Open Market Operation Durable Goods Orders
19-May-93 11:30am Open Market Operation Merchandise Trade
8-Jul-93 11:30am Open Market Operation
18-Aug-93 11:30am Open Market Operation
22-Sep-93 11:30am Open Market Operation U.S. Budget Deficit
17-Nov-93 11:30am Open Market Operation Housing Starts and Permits
22-Dec-93 11:30am Open Market Operation GDP and NIPAs
Data Appendix Table 1
Monetary Policy Announcement Dates and Times
Date Time Method of Announcement Intermeeting Move? Other Macroeconomic Data Releases That Day    
4-Feb-94 11:05am Post-Meeting Press Release Employment Report
22-Mar-94 2:20pm Post-Meeting Press Release Merchandise Trade
18-Apr-94 10:06am Post-Meeting Press Release T
17-May-94 2:26pm Post-Meeting Press Release Housing Starts and Permits
6-Jul-94 2:18pm Post-Meeting Press Release Auto Sales
16-Aug-94 1:18pm Post-Meeting Press Release Housing Starts and Permits
27-Sep-94 2:18pm Post-Meeting Press Release Consumer Confidence
15-Nov-94 2:20pm Post-Meeting Press Release Ind Production, Cap Utilization, International Trade
20-Dec-94 2:17pm Post-Meeting Press Release International Trade
1-Feb-95 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Leading Indicators, Auto Sales
28-Mar-95 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Consumer Confidence
23-May-95 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release
6-Jul-95 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Leading Indicators, Auto Sales
22-Aug-95 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release
26-Sep-95 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Consumer Confidence
15-Nov-95 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release CPI, Ind. Prod., Cap. Util, Business Inventories
19-Dec-95 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release GDP and NIPAs, Housing Starts and Permits
31-Jan-96 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release PPI, Purchasing Managers Survey
26-Mar-96 11:39am Post-Meeting Press Release Consumer Confidence
21-May-96 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release U.S. Budget Deficit
3-Jul-96 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Factory Orders, Auto Sales
20-Aug-96 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release International Trade
24-Sep-96 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Consumer Confidence
13-Nov-96 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release PPI
17-Dec-96 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Housing Starts and Permits
5-Feb-97 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Factory Orders, Auto Sales
25-Mar-97 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Consumer Confidence, Existing Home Sales
20-May-97 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release
2-Jul-97 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Factory Orders
19-Aug-97 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Housing Starts and Permits
30-Sep-97 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Consumer Confidence, New Home Sales
12-Nov-97 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release
16-Dec-97 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release CPI, Housing Starts and Permits
4-Feb-98 2:12pm Post-Meeting Press Release
31-Mar-98 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Consumer Confidence
19-May-98 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Housing Starts and Permits
1-Jul-98 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release NAPM Survey, Leading Indicators, Auto Sales
18-Aug-98 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release CPI, International Trade
29-Sep-98 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Consumer Confidence
15-Oct-98 3:15pm Intermeeting Press Release T PPI, Business Inventories
17-Nov-98 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release CPI, Business Inventories
22-Dec-98 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release
3-Feb-99 2:12pm Post-Meeting Press Release Auto Sales
30-Mar-99 2:12pm Post-Meeting Press Release Consumer Confidence
18-May-99 2:11pm Post-Meeting Press Release Housing Starts and Permits
30-Jun-99 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Leading Indicators
24-Aug-99 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release
5-Oct-99 2:12pm Post-Meeting Press Release Leading Indicators
16-Nov-99 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Industrial Production, Capacity Utilization
Date Time Method of Announcement Intermeeting Move? Other Macroeconomic Data Releases That Day    
21-Dec-99 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release U.S. Budget Deficit
2-Feb-00 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release New Home Sales, Leading Indicators, Auto Sales
21-Mar-00 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release International Trade
16-May-00 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release CPI, Housing Starts and Permits
28-Jun-00 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Durable Goods Sales
22-Aug-00 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release
3-Oct-00 2:12pm Post-Meeting Press Release New Home Sales, Leading Indicators
15-Nov-00 2:12pm Post-Meeting Press Release Ind. Prod., Cap. Util., Business Inventories
19-Dec-00 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release International Trade
3-Jan-01 1:13pm Intermeeting Press Release T
31-Jan-01 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release GDP and NIPAs, New Home Sales
20-Mar-01 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release International Trade, U.S. Budget Deficit
18-Apr-01 10:54am Intermeeting Press Release T Leading Indicators, International Trade
15-May-01 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release
27-Jun-01 2:12pm Post-Meeting Press Release
21-Aug-01 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release
17-Sep-01 8:20am Intermeeting Press Release T
2-Oct-01 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release
6-Nov-01 2:20pm Post-Meeting Press Release
11-Dec-01 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release
30-Jan-02 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release GDP and NIPAs
19-Mar-02 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release International Trade
7-May-02 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release
26-Jun-02 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Durable Goods Orders, New Home Sales
13-Aug-02 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Retail Sales
24-Sep-02 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Consumer Confidence
6-Nov-02 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release
10-Dec-02 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release
29-Jan-03 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release
18-Mar-03 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Housing Starts and Permits
6-May-03 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release
25-Jun-03 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Drbl Goods Ords, New Home Sales, Exist Home Sales
12-Aug-03 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release
16-Sep-03 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release CPI
28-Oct-03 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Durable Goods Orders, Consumer Confidence
9-Dec-03 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release
28-Jan-04 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Durable Goods Orders, New Home Sales
16-Mar-04 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Housing Starts and Permits
4-May-04 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Factory Orders
30-Jun-04 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release
10-Aug-04 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release
21-Sep-04 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Housing Starts and Permits
10-Nov-04 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release U.S. Budget, International Trade
14-Dec-04 2:15pm Post-Meeting Press Release Industrial Prod., Capacity Util., International Trade
8-Feb-90 -1.4 -1.4 -1.4 0.0 0.0
28-Mar-90 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
16-May-90 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
5-Jul-90 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
13-Jul-90 -13.8 -13.8 -13.8 0.0 0.0 T
22-Aug-90 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3-Oct-90 1.1 2.2 2.2 1.1 1.1
29-Oct-90 -3.0 -3.0 -2.0 1.0 0.0 T
14-Nov-90 1.9 1.9 3.8 1.9 0.0
7-Dec-90 -9.0 -9.0 -27.1 -18.1 0.0 T T
18-Dec-90 -21.5 -21.5 -21.5 0.0 0.0
8-Jan-91 -13.5 -14.8 -17.5 -4.0 -1.4 T
1-Feb-91 -7.3 -10.4 -25.9 -18.7 -3.1 T T
7-Feb-91 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
8-Mar-91 -2.7 -10.8 -16.2 -13.5 -8.1 T T
27-Mar-91 -2.0 -1.0 -2.0 0.0 1.0
30-Apr-91 -18.0 -17.0 -17.0 1.0 1.0 T
15-May-91 1.9 1.9 1.9 0.0 0.0
5-Jul-91 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 T
6-Aug-91 -18.6 -18.6 -14.9 3.7 0.0 T
21-Aug-91 12.4 12.4 12.4 0.0 0.0
13-Sep-91 -5.3 -5.3 -5.3 0.0 0.0 T
2-Oct-91 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 0.0 0.0
30-Oct-91 -3.0 -5.0 -6.0 -3.0 -2.0 T
6-Nov-91 -10.0 -10.0 -12.5 -2.5 0.0
6-Dec-91 0.0 0.0 -8.7 -8.7 0.0 T T
18-Dec-91 4.8 4.8 4.8 0.0 0.0
20-Dec-91 -36.6 -36.6 -28.2 8.5 0.0 T
6-Feb-92 1.3 1.3 -1.3 -2.5 0.0
1-Apr-92 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
9-Apr-92 -21.4 -21.4 -24.3 -2.9 0.0 T
20-May-92 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2-Jul-92 -8.6 -10.7 -36.3 -27.8 -2.1 T
19-Aug-92 2.6 2.6 2.6 0.0 0.0
4-Sep-92 0.0 0.0 -21.9 -21.9 0.0 T T
7-Oct-92 0.0 0.0 5.2 5.2 0.0
18-Nov-92 -5.0 -5.0 -10.0 -5.0 0.0
23-Dec-92 3.9 3.9 3.9 0.0 0.0
4-Feb-93 0.0 0.0 -1.2 -1.2 0.0
24-Mar-93 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
19-May-93 -2.6 -2.6 -2.6 0.0 0.0
8-Jul-93 2.7 2.7 2.7 0.0 0.0
18-Aug-93 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
22-Sep-93 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
17-Nov-93 2.3 2.3 2.3 0.0 0.0
22-Dec-93 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
---Differences (bp)---
Data Appendix Table 2
Monetary Policy Surprises
---Monetary Policy Surprise (bp)---
Date Intermeeting Move?
Employment 
Report?
Daily - 
Tight Wide - Tight
Tight 
Window    
(30 min.)
Wide 
Window    
(1 hour)
Daily 
Window    
(1 day)
---Differences (bp)------Monetary Policy Surprise (bp)---
Date Intermeeting Move?
Employment 
Report?
Daily - 
Tight Wide - Tight
Tight 
Window    
(30 min.)
Wide 
Window    
(1 hour)
Daily 
Window    
(1 day)
4-Feb-94 16.3 15.2 11.7 -4.7 -1.2 T
22-Mar-94 0.0 0.0 -3.4 -3.4 0.0
18-Apr-94 15.0 15.0 10.0 -5.0 0.0 T
17-May-94 11.1 11.1 13.3 2.2 0.0
6-Jul-94 -5.0 -3.7 -5.0 0.0 1.2
16-Aug-94 12.4 14.5 14.5 2.1 2.1
27-Sep-94 -9.0 -9.0 -8.0 1.0 0.0
15-Nov-94 12.0 12.0 14.0 2.0 0.0
20-Dec-94 -22.6 -22.6 -16.9 5.6 0.0
1-Feb-95 6.2 6.2 5.2 -1.0 0.0
28-Mar-95 -1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
23-May-95 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6-Jul-95 -11.2 -7.4 -1.2 9.9 3.7
22-Aug-95 3.4 3.4 0.0 -3.4 0.0
26-Sep-95 3.0 4.0 4.0 1.0 1.0
15-Nov-95 4.0 5.0 6.0 2.0 1.0
19-Dec-95 -9.0 -10.3 -10.3 -1.3 -1.3
31-Jan-96 -3.0 -3.0 -7.0 -4.0 0.0
26-Mar-96 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
21-May-96 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3-Jul-96 -7.2 -6.6 -5.0 2.2 0.6
20-Aug-96 -2.8 -2.8 -4.2 -1.4 0.0
24-Sep-96 -12.0 -12.0 -13.0 -1.0 0.0
13-Nov-96 -1.8 -1.8 0.0 1.8 0.0
17-Dec-96 1.1 0.0 1.1 0.0 -1.1
5-Feb-97 -3.7 -3.0 -3.0 0.6 0.6
25-Mar-97 4.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 0.0
20-May-97 -9.9 -9.9 -11.3 -1.4 0.0
2-Jul-97 -2.1 -1.1 -1.6 0.5 1.1
19-Aug-97 0.0 0.0 -1.3 -1.3 0.0
30-Sep-97 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
12-Nov-97 -4.2 -4.2 -4.2 0.0 0.0
16-Dec-97 0.0 0.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.0
4-Feb-98 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
31-Mar-98 -1.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
19-May-98 -2.6 -2.6 -2.6 0.0 0.0
1-Jul-98 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 0.0 0.0
18-Aug-98 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.0 0.0
29-Sep-98 5.0 6.0 6.0 1.0 1.0
15-Oct-98 -24.2 -24.2 -20.3 3.9 0.0 T
17-Nov-98 -6.9 -5.8 -5.8 1.2 1.2
22-Dec-98 0.0 -1.7 -1.7 -1.7 -1.7
3-Feb-99 0.6 0.6 0.0 -0.6 0.0
30-Mar-99 -1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
18-May-99 -1.2 -1.2 -3.6 -2.4 0.0
30-Jun-99 -3.0 -4.0 -4.0 -1.0 -1.0
24-Aug-99 3.5 3.0 3.0 -0.5 -0.5
5-Oct-99 -4.2 -4.2 -4.2 0.0 0.0
16-Nov-99 7.5 9.6 8.6 1.1 2.1
---Differences (bp)------Monetary Policy Surprise (bp)---
Date Intermeeting Move?
Employment 
Report?
Daily - 
Tight Wide - Tight
Tight 
Window    
(30 min.)
Wide 
Window    
(1 hour)
Daily 
Window    
(1 day)
21-Dec-99 1.6 1.6 1.6 0.0 0.0
2-Feb-00 -5.9 -5.9 -5.4 0.5 0.0
21-Mar-00 -4.7 -4.7 -3.1 1.6 0.0
16-May-00 4.1 3.1 5.2 1.0 -1.0
28-Jun-00 -2.5 -2.0 -2.0 0.5 0.5
22-Aug-00 -1.7 0.0 -1.7 0.0 1.7
3-Oct-00 0.0 -0.6 0.0 0.0 -0.6
15-Nov-00 -1.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
19-Dec-00 6.5 6.5 5.2 -1.3 0.0
3-Jan-01 -39.3 -36.5 -38.2 1.1 2.8 T
31-Jan-01 3.5 4.0 0.5 -3.0 0.5
20-Mar-01 7.1 5.6 5.6 -1.4 -1.4
18-Apr-01 -43.8 -46.3 -42.5 1.3 -2.5 T
15-May-01 -9.7 -7.8 -7.8 1.9 1.9
27-Jun-01 10.5 11.0 8.5 -2.0 0.5
21-Aug-01 1.6 1.6 1.6 0.0 0.0
17-Sep-01 omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted T
2-Oct-01 -3.7 -3.7 -7.0 -3.2 0.0
6-Nov-01 -15.0 -15.0 -10.0 5.0 0.0
11-Dec-01 -0.8 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.8
30-Jan-02 2.5 1.5 1.5 -1.0 -1.0
19-Mar-02 -2.6 -2.6 -2.6 0.0 0.0
7-May-02 0.7 0.7 0.0 -0.7 0.0
26-Jun-02 0.0 0.0 -2.0 -2.0 0.0
13-Aug-02 4.3 4.3 3.4 -0.9 0.0
24-Sep-02 2.0 2.5 2.0 0.0 0.5
6-Nov-02 -20.0 -18.8 -19.4 0.6 1.3
10-Dec-02 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
29-Jan-03 1.0 0.5 0.5 -0.5 -0.5
18-Mar-03 2.4 3.6 4.8 2.4 1.2
6-May-03 3.7 3.7 3.7 0.0 0.0
25-Jun-03 13.5 12.5 12.5 -1.0 -1.0
12-Aug-03 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
16-Sep-03 1.1 1.1 0.0 -1.1 0.0
28-Oct-03 -0.5 -0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0
9-Dec-03 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
28-Jan-04 0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.5
16-Mar-04 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4-May-04 -1.2 -1.2 -0.6 0.6 0.0
30-Jun-04 -0.5 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 -1.0
10-Aug-04 0.7 1.5 2.2 1.5 0.7
21-Sep-04 0.0 0.0 1.7 1.7 0.0
10-Nov-04 -0.8 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.8
14-Dec-04 -0.9 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.9
Target Path FOMC Target Path FOMC Target Path FOMC
Date Factor Factor Statement? Date Factor Factor Statement? Date Factor Factor Statement?
8-Feb-90 0.3 5.8 16-Aug-94 10.7 -8.3 T 15-Nov-00 2.7 2.2 T
28-Mar-90 1.5 -3.3 27-Sep-94 -4.3 7.9 19-Dec-00 7.5 -3.9 T
16-May-90 2.5 -3.4 15-Nov-94 10.3 -3.4 T 3-Jan-01 -32.3 22.8 T
5-Jul-90 0.4 3.9 20-Dec-94 -15.1 26.6 31-Jan-01 8.2 -12.5 T
13-Jul-90 0.9 -1.0 1-Feb-95 7.8 5.5 T 20-Mar-01 -2.3 -13.5 T
22-Aug-90 2.3 0.8 28-Mar-95 5.3 2.2 18-Apr-01 -48.5 -3.2 T
3-Oct-90 1.3 -0.4 23-May-95 2.2 -0.3 15-May-01 -8.6 -15.7 T
29-Oct-90 -0.9 5.0 6-Jul-95 -8.7 -38.4 T 27-Jun-01 11.8 2.3 T
14-Nov-90 4.7 -0.6 22-Aug-95 4.7 9.0 21-Aug-01 2.9 -9.7 T
7-Dec-90 -5.3 5.7 26-Sep-95 5.5 9.7 2-Oct-01 -1.8 -6.4 T
18-Dec-90 -16.1 14.1 15-Nov-95 3.9 3.6 6-Nov-01 -12.7 -15.7 T
8-Jan-91 -11.7 -4.6 19-Dec-95 -6.5 4.8 T 11-Dec-01 1.9 -18.1 T
1-Feb-91 -6.2 1.8 31-Jan-96 -0.2 -2.4 T 30-Jan-02 4.2 3.6 T
7-Feb-91 1.3 -0.2 26-Mar-96 1.6 4.0 19-Mar-02 -0.3 -11.7 T
8-Mar-91 -3.5 -3.8 21-May-96 2.7 3.8 7-May-02 3.5 -11.4 T
27-Mar-91 4.9 -10.5 3-Jul-96 -3.0 5.3 26-Jun-02 2.4 2.3 T
30-Apr-91 -18.7 -10.5 20-Aug-96 0.8 5.2 13-Aug-02 8.1 -37.2 T
15-May-91 3.0 2.0 24-Sep-96 -10.6 0.4 24-Sep-02 3.8 -5.6 T
5-Jul-91 0.5 5.8 13-Nov-96 1.6 -2.4 6-Nov-02 -16.3 7.2 T
6-Aug-91 -13.5 -0.8 17-Dec-96 3.1 -1.0 10-Dec-02 1.9 7.0 T
21-Aug-91 12.0 -7.2 5-Feb-97 -0.6 9.0 29-Jan-03 3.5 10.4 T
13-Sep-91 -0.4 6.2 25-Mar-97 6.5 9.6 T 18-Mar-03 2.9 -2.4 T
2-Oct-91 2.1 2.2 20-May-97 -8.3 2.1 6-May-03 5.2 -27.0 T
30-Oct-91 -1.6 4.3 2-Jul-97 1.4 2.3 25-Jun-03 14.4 10.6 T
6-Nov-91 -11.7 -1.3 19-Aug-97 2.6 3.3 12-Aug-03 3.7 -11.9 T
6-Dec-91 2.1 2.6 30-Sep-97 2.1 0.8 16-Sep-03 3.4 -1.3 T
18-Dec-91 3.4 5.6 12-Nov-97 0.2 -2.6 28-Oct-03 3.9 -24.4 T
20-Dec-91 -32.2 -10.2 16-Dec-97 1.8 -0.4 9-Dec-03 0.2 13.9 T
6-Feb-92 3.7 -1.6 4-Feb-98 1.9 5.4 28-Jan-04 -1.1 42.7 T
1-Apr-92 0.1 4.3 31-Mar-98 1.1 2.6 16-Mar-04 4.1 -17.8 T
9-Apr-92 -19.0 -22.5 19-May-98 0.2 0.5 4-May-04 0.9 5.1 T
20-May-92 4.1 1.6 1-Jul-98 3.6 0.4 30-Jun-04 0.4 -1.7 T
2-Jul-92 -9.7 20.8 18-Aug-98 3.1 -0.9 10-Aug-04 4.3 7.5 T
19-Aug-92 4.2 -1.0 29-Sep-98 9.4 -5.3 T 21-Sep-04 2.5 -2.9 T
4-Sep-92 2.6 -2.3 15-Oct-98 -24.0 -22.6 T 10-Nov-04 3.0 -7.6 T
7-Oct-92 3.8 -0.1 17-Nov-98 1.3 1.4 T 14-Dec-04 1.7 -1.8 T
18-Nov-92 4.8 1.2 22-Dec-98 2.9 -0.3
23-Dec-92 3.8 -6.2 3-Feb-99 2.7 2.2
4-Feb-93 0.0 3.8 30-Mar-99 1.5 -4.1
24-Mar-93 2.9 3.5 18-May-99 0.5 32.8 T
19-May-93 0.0 -1.2 30-Jun-99 -2.1 -16.2 T
8-Jul-93 1.8 0.1 24-Aug-99 5.7 -5.8 T
18-Aug-93 6.4 -0.5 5-Oct-99 -2.7 25.8 T
22-Sep-93 4.0 -3.2 16-Nov-99 11.9 3.8 T
17-Nov-93 0.6 1.9 21-Dec-99 2.4 9.3 T
22-Dec-93 3.2 -6.7 2-Feb-00 -2.0 9.0 T
4-Feb-94 8.1 21.8 T 21-Mar-00 2.5 2.3 T
22-Mar-94 -2.2 -4.9 16-May-00 7.4 4.9 T
18-Apr-94 10.7 6.6 28-Jun-00 -0.2 -2.1 T
17-May-94 7.2 -21.2 T 22-Aug-00 0.8 8.1 T
6-Jul-94 1.8 4.0 3-Oct-00 1.4 12.7 T
Data Appendix Table 3
Target and Path Factors
